Also published on the Atlantic Monthly’s Business Channel.
Timothy Geithner has released his proposal on how to regulate the OTC derivatives market. The proposal is broad in its scope and the regulations proposed would have a profound impact on market practice if implemented. Despite this, the sleuths at NPR claim to have discovered a “huge loophole” in the plan. I’ve also been studying both Geithner’s proposal and the NPR article on the subject, and the only holes that I found were in NPR’s understanding of the OTC market. In order to fully understand the earthly implications of Geithner’s policies and the gargantuan errors made on Planet Money, we should probably understand what the OTC derivatives market is. So, let’s begin with a brief overview of what the OTC market is and what it isn’t.
What Is An OTC Derivative?
A derivative is a contract that derives its value by reference to “something else.” That something else can be pretty much anything that can be objectively observed and measured. That said, when people talk about derivatives, the “something else” is usually an index, rate, or security. For example, an option to purchase common stock is a fairly well-known and ubiquitous derivative. So are futures for commodities such as pork belly and oil. However, these are not the kind of derivatives that Geithner is talking about. Geithner is talking about OTC derivatives, or “over the counter” derivatives. This category of derivatives includes the much maligned “credit default swap” market, as well as other larger but apparently less notorious markets, such as the interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives markets. The key defining characteristic of an OTC derivative is that it is entered into directly between the parties. This is in contrast to exchange-traded derivatives, such as options to purchase common stock. Highly bespoke OTC derivatives are often negotiated at length between the parties and involve a great deal of collaboration between bankers, lawyers, and other consultants. For other, more standardized OTC contracts, commonly referred to as “plain vanilla trades”, contracts can be entered into on a much more rapid and informal basis, e.g., via email.
For the limited purpose of wrapping your head around the world of derivatives, think of all derivatives as being in one of three broad categories: (1) exchange-traded derivatives (e.g., options on common stock and futures on pork belly); (2) standardized OTC contracts (e.g., your basic credit default swap); and (3) bespoke OTC contracts (transaction specific, often more complex instruments).
The “Huge Loophole”
NPR claims that Geithner’s proposal has a “huge loophole”, which they uncover through the following summary:
- Banks and other players have to tell the government when they buy and sell these derivatives. That means the government can know how many are out there and who has them.
- If banks and others are buying and selling standardized derivatives, they must trade them on an exchange, sort of like how stocks are traded on an exchange. That way it’s more transparent and the prices should more accurately reflect the market sentiment.
- But — and here’s the big but — banks and others are perfectly free to continue trading custom-made derivatives as private transactions between two parties.
In case you didn’t catch it, that last part was supposed to be the clincher. But before we can appreciate why it’s not a clincher, we need to do a bit more homework on the OTC market. In Geithner’s proposal, there’s a lot of talk about CCPs, or “central counterparties.” These are often incorrectly equated with exchanges. CCPs are not exchanges. They are exactly what their name suggests: a central counterparty for swaps of a particular type. After two parties enter into an OTC trade together, they novate, or more colloquially, move their trades to the CCP. So unlike trades executed on an exchange, CCP trades are entered into directly between the two parties, but later shifted over to the CCP. There are a lot of reasons why this is done, and they’re beyond the scope of this article. But if you’re interested in reading more about CCPs, go here. The key take-away is that CCPs are not exchanges, but more like risk repository/management systems where trades get moved to after they’re executed.
So, NPR believes that because OTC market participants are not forced to trade on exchanges, their trades will continue to be unnoticed and unregulated. This is completely false for two reasons: first, trades that are capable of being moved to a CCP would be required to be moved to a CCP under Geithner’s plan; second, even if they weren’t, Geithner’s plan calls for all OTC trades, including those in the third bespoke category, to be recorded in what are known as “trade repositories,” such as DTCC’s Deriv/SERV. Here is the relevant language from Geithner’s proposal:
[I]f an OTC derivative is accepted for clearing by one or more fully regulated CCPs, it should create a presumption that it is a standardized contract and thus required to be cleared.
[A]ll trades not cleared by CCPs [are] to be reported to a regulated trade repository.
This is in contrast to NPR’s second point above, which asserts that all such trades would be traded on an exchange. That is wrong. What this says is: all trades that can be moved to a CCP (not an exchange) should be, and it will be assumed that this is required; and if they’re not moved to a CCP, they have to be recorded in a trade repository. So, by definition, this proposal would make regulators aware of every single trade in the OTC market since every trade is either on a CCP, in which case the CCP will record its existence, or not on a CCP, in which case the trade repository will record its existence. But how do we explain NPR’s blunder in their third point? That blunder comes from yet another equivocation between a CCP and an exchange. The relevant language from Geithner’s proposal is as follows:
[Relevant laws should be amended to impose] the encouragement of regulated institutions to make greater use of regulated exchange-traded derivatives.
NPR hones in on the “encourage” language, taking this to mean that market participants will have a choice between using an exchange or being unregulated financial pirates. Of course, those swashbuckling financiers will choose the latter. As I’m sure you’re starting to see, this is a false dilemma. What Geithner is suggesting here is that regulated institutions avoid the OTC market altogether, and make use of derivatives from the first category above (the exchange traded ones). Of course, such a policy should be suggestive and not prescriptive, because contrary to popular belief, OTC products serve legitimate needs that exchange traded products don’t meet, at least not yet.
Customized Misinformation
No finance bashing story is complete without a kooky conspiracy theory, and so in order to fulfil the meme, NPR offers us an explanation as to why those crazy credit default swaps are so darn complex:
It seems reasonable to expect that every single sales team on Wall Street will work very hard to convince their customers that they have Very Special, One-Of-A-Kind Credit Derivatives that are far better than the boring old ones traded on the exchange.
Unfortunately for NPR, this is complete nonsense. The vast majority of credit default swaps are completely standardized and have been for a while. Recent changes to how CDS are priced has increased fungibility even further. In fact, one of NPR’s commenters actually pointed this out. The NPR commenter writes:
Virtually ALL CDS contracts are standardized. Which is to say that I can open a position with Goldman Sachs and unwind that position at Citigroup. These instruments will be covered under the Obama proposal and are well suited to being exchange traded. Are there bespoke products available in the derivative market place? Absolutely. But they account for a minuscule portion of the overall business.
But NPR doesn’t stop there. Acknowledging the possibility (fact) that they are wrong about standardized CDS, they go on to claim that:
[Even assuming the commenter] is right (he probably is) and most currently-traded CDS would qualify for a new exchange or clearinghouse; it seems fair to guess that lots of CDS operations will be looking for ways to avoid that clearinghouse and all the extra regulation and transparency and lowered commissions it brings with it.
Yet again, unfortunately for NPR, that is more nonsense. The major swap dealers have already set up a CCP on their own, before regulators required them to do so, and are currently moving trades to it. Swap dealers do not make money by over-complicating products and duping trillions of dollars worth of capital. They make money by creating a market. That is, they buy and sell swaps, creating a market, and pocket the difference between the prices at which they buy and sell. If you want to use jargon, you would say they create “liquidity” for swaps. That’s their business. Making complicated products that aren’t fungible does not advance that business model. Even more importantly, as we noted above, Geithner’s proposal wouldn’t let them off the hook simply because they used bespoke products. If the trade is accepted on a CCP, it is presumed to be required to go there. And even if it’s not, it gets reported anyway.
Clearly Planet Money doesn’t think it’s a very good proposal. But in my humble opinion, it’s at least a reasonable proposal for the residents of planet Earth.
Anything less than full and complete transparency with standardized, and adequate capital reserves is just more smoke and mirrors. What is important to understand is that no one trusts Wall Street – that is the underlying weakness with all of these gov’t programs – we want full transparency right down to the capital backing the derivative.
Case in point: About six months ago The Economist reported that the “notional value” of CDS market was around $50-60 trillion. The BIS tells us it is closer to $648 trillion.
So you may find Geithner’s proposal reassuring, and no one trusts him either, but reliance on anything other than full and accessible transparency is insufficient. In fact, what good is the CDS market other than another commissioning mechanism and bubble mechanism for “no value proposition” Wall Street paper pushers and gamblers?
E.g., how are naked derivatives bets treated? So they are reported, does that mean that Wall Street can’t game the system? We know they can – they control Congress.
Charles Brown,
“About six months ago The Economist reported that the “notional value” of CDS market was around $50-60 trillion. The BIS tells us it is closer to $648 trillion.”
The BIS certainly did not say that, because that is wrong. Here is what the BIS ACTUALLY said.
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf
People don’t trust Wall Street because they’d rather succumb to speculation and conspiracy theories, like you just did. Rather than look up the BIS report for yourself and read it, you relied on and reported a completely inaccurate figure. As a result I suspect that your paranoia is the result of not being informed. You are probably not alone that respect, so I’m not trying to pick on you as an individual. But you should follow up on things, investigate, think yourself. These are complicated issues that shouldn’t have simple answers, like “Wall Street controls Congress.”
Thank you for that clarification: the total Derivatives market is $648 trillion and the CDS market is $57.3T
What’s the difference? These are enormous amounts of speculation, or excuse me, “hedging”, that the US gov’t is now guaranteeing in one form or another. Let’s see, $57 trillion is about 4X the annual GDP of the US?
It’s only (only) $57 trillion so that makes everything ok? You have a few trillion laying around to cover these bets? Why should the world’s populations be covering the betting in the CDS casino? Why isn’t it compressed and counterparty obligations eliminated? It seems to me that these are sham contracts; if you can’t collect from the other side of the bet that’s the CDS players problem, not ours.
You can “deconstruct” and parse the data and events as “systemic failure” that just needs the right touch of regulation and tweaking, but that’s Wall Street spin.
Parse away – it’s drivel.
Charles Brown,
The actual economic value is much less than $57 trillion. If you look to the right, you’ll see the “gross value” column. That’s the current value of the trades. That’s $5.6 trillion. And that is the gross value, not the net value. The net value is even less than that, because many of the trades are pass throughs, since the dealers make their money by creating a market. I recommend you read this:
http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/10/24/netting-demystified/
I read it. I’m even less convinced that CDS is a viable market that adds one cent of value to the economy. It’s a great vehicle for betting though. And, we know who is covering those bets right now, don’t we? What really astounds me is that this casino is still open. Yet, you question the influence of Wall Street over Congress?
Two questions and one more comment.
What portion of the CDS “counterparty risk” is sitting with the large investment banks, or correctly, former investment banks, including the shadow economy? You may recall they were investment banks on a Friday and commercial banks again on the following Monday morning. Do you know? Does anyone know?
If the investment banks/shadow economy players are supplying the BIS with information on their CDS activities, why makes you think that information is accurate? How do you know it isn’t pure fantasy?
You talk as if $5 trillion in gambling wagers from a bunch of bankrupt banks is some sort of trivia game, and you completely ignore my principal point. That is, no one believes what you and other people on Wall Street have to say.
Wall Street does control Congress. Sen. Durbin said it publicly a few weeks ago and I heard my own representative say as much last week. Ever look at Obama’s campaign donations from Wall Street? Are you denying that Wall Street wields primary influence over Congress?
It’s hardly surprising to me that you can’t agree with some of my suppositions, but I think we can agree that you folks lack a value proposition. There is always obfuscation in complexity, and that describes the basic characteristic of these instruments and the nature of this opaque market. You imply thsy because the nature of the instruments and market are complex that somehow that justifies the misinformation fostered upon the public, but not from the non-Wall Street end. More arrogance. And we all know who is feeding the press. I must say, the Wall Street spin machine is something to behold.
Down please.
And I vehemently object to the way you people label anyone that is critical of Wall Street as “uninformed” and “conspiracy theorists.” Your response, in essence is, “Your understanding of the facts and numbers is misguided and therefore you don’t know what you are talking about; it’s just too complex for non-financial professionals like you. You just need to sit down and listen while we explain the way things really work.” Right, you are the Oracle at Delphi. Geez, you should hear yourselves talk – you sound like idiots.
What a bunch of deceitful drivel. You all seem to have forgotten Wall Street’s primary role in this capitalist economy: the efficient allocation of capital.
Next you are going to tell me that you and your pals really are efficient, but I just don’t understand it. Which is more childish, pathetic sophistry. You have no legitimate counterargument; just look at the results.
How can Wall Street argue it has a value proposition when it has proven itself so puerile, grossly incompetent and remains defiant in the face of devastating social consequences?
Why should anyone care to listen to your pompous ignorance?
Bankers’ Paradise
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090608/hayes
Germane quotes to our discussion from this article:
“My fear is that you can’t trust the banks to decide if the loan is going to be impaired,” said a hedge-fund analyst who has studied the issue.” (From one of your own)
“There’s a heck of a lot of folks in Washington that mistake standards as policy,” one FASB official told me. “It’s not policy. It’s about measurement.”
“These members of Congress are being told what it is the banks want them to hear without having an effective counter,” says Allen Weltmann, a senior adviser at FASB. “It’s not unique to this issue–it’s typical of Washington on matters like this.”
But of course, it’s just another conspiracy theory, right? What I really find amusing about the change in the mark to market rules is now we have a bunch of bankrupt banks trying to raise equity with Balance Sheets more opaque than ever. Just imagine, they are valuing their own junk debt on their own balance sheets.
I also remember the SIV shams, which strategy got it’s field test at Enron. A. Fastow went to prison but I expect no one will go to prison on Wall Street except the most egregious, media-frenzy offenders. The “apologists” rhetoric in this regard is also classic Wall Street spin.
Charles Davi, financial professionals, lawyers, et al,
Could someone please explain the value proposition to the US and world economies of the CDS market?
No need to use metaphors – please explain in your own terms using all of the financial terminology you think necessary for your explanation.
No one seems to be able to provide an answer to this simple question. Is there a value proposition to anyone other than the financial people who are directly involved in this market? If so, what is it?
And what happens if the broader derivatives market begins to melt down; i.e., the futures market? Granted, it has more regulation but there is plenty of leverage available in this market as well – at least 2:1 even for the worst credit risk.
Anybody home?
Charles Brown,
“Could someone please explain the value proposition to the US and world economies of the CDS market?”
CDS allow credit risk to be traded in a highly liquid market. They also allow credit risk to be diversified in a very low cost manner. That reduces the cost of credit. That is good for everyone.
>CDS allow credit risk to be traded in a highly liquid market.
What about a moderately liquid, quasi-liquid or non-liquid market, like we have had recently? That’s a huge qualifier for a market this size. Are all markets highly liquid?
>They also allow credit risk to be diversified in a very low cost manner.
This strikes me as being disingenuous, and utterly false. The first and only time this proposition has been tested it failed; AIG, et al. Wasn’t securitization supposed to handle “diversification of credit risk?” That doesn’t seem to be working out too well either, does it? Other than charging more fees and having more paper to leverage, what is the use of these “pyramids of diversification?” With every additional layer on the pyramid the objective of “diversification of risk” is undermined by the very nature of the pyramid of “diversification dilution”, and weakens the rationale for having a CDS in the first place.
For example, we have a residential and commercial mortgages passed on for packaging, then we have two “diversification events”: the packaging of a mortgage-backed security and then a repackaging of those into Collateralized Debt Obligations. This is the “box within a box” gift trick, except that the final box is empty.
>That reduces the cost of credit. That is good for everyone.
Perhaps in a “highly liquid market” or credit bubble, otherwise, as we see, the instruments require the taxpayer to be a guarantor if the market becomes “illiquid.” It seems that the people buying and selling CDSs don’t believe in their value, and have much faith in “counterparty risk”, but the rest of us should? In reality, counterparty risk = taxpayer risk. Further, I don’t believe that regulation can change the basic flaw of this concept – it looks like a fee and risk-free casino. Where else can a bettor obtain extraordinarily levels of leverage and make naked bets with little capital at risk? You can’t even do that in Las Vegas.
Your statement may have been the original rationale for a CDS market, but it has proven itself to be false. The CDS market is an abject failure and serves no purpose in a properly functioning economic system, especially when there exists a pyramid of prior “diversification” via securitization. It would appear that the CDS market is dysfunctional in all but the most ideal economic situations.
As for the cost of credit, check the sovereign bond market lately? As the Fed continues to take this “counterparty junk” onto its balance sheet it undermines our currency and eventually, must raise the cost of credit.
The CDS typically passes under rubric of “financial engineering”, but it just looks and smells like a common street con. Lots of fees, trading and exchanges with little transparency, and ultimately, no risk. Where can you get that deal other than on Wall Street? And it is all legitimized because you are all “really smart people” and have lawyers waiving 500-page CDS contracts into cameras – trust us. In fact, you have shown yourselves, without qualification, to be nothing more than common thieves with fallacious powers of discernment, and a pax on the body politic.
Charles Brown,
All of the market failures you are talking about stem from one common origin, and none of them have to do with advanced techniques in finance. The root cause is much simpler than that: taking on bad credit risk. The market systematically underpriced credit risk. There is no question that this occurred. But that has nothing to do with fancy finance. This could’ve without derivatives or securitization (see e.g., the Great Depression). So, my point is that you’re missing the point. I’m not arguing that nothing went wrong. I’m arguing that banning the recent advances in finance will do nothing to stop this from occurring again, and simultaneously deprive us of the legitimate benefits these techniques offer.
While it’s obvious to any observer that many problems stem from a credit bubble, the credit bubble did not exist in a vacuum; far from it. The problems also stem from an asset bubble, a housing bubble, a commodities bubble a Fed bubble AND a credit bubble. My point that you keep missing is that some of the instruments created by this “brilliant” financial engineering (a misnomer if I ever heard one) were direct catalysts for ALL of these bubbles. These bubbles were enabled and sustained by CDS and other instruments with no value proposition outside of the Casino activities of Wall Street investment banks and other pyramid-packaging houses. Worse, this pyramid scheme provided a false sense of security, which enable more gambling and leverage.
I am not arguing that all “advances in finance” be banned. I am arguing that, specifically, the CDS market be put out of business, permanently. As recent history clearly demonstrates, it is nothing more than a tool and catalyst for speculation via a “pyramid risk-aversion” scheme.
My point is that you and your pals are in a “denial bubble” and pursue the propping-up of the CDS market with taxpayer money with the claim that it has a vital value proposition to the capitalist system, where in fact, it’s only value proposition rests is based on a pyramid scheme designed to inflate the profitability and economic share of Wall Street operators and banks, while defrauding outside investors with a false sense of security and “hedging.”
Your response is disingenuous. You just can’t seem to get your minds around anything other than how “smart” you all are where in fact, you just short-sighted twits in silk suspenders. You create little or no “new value” via these financial instruments to the broader economy. I know you would like to think you do, but you don’t – it’s not the nature of the banking business, or it shouldn’t be in my view.
You’re not doing your jobs and therefore, should suffer the standard consequences in a capitalist system: obsolescence. You guys remind me of the current auto industry, only with much more political influence, and therein lay the rub, which leads to my final point. BTW, as of today, can you tell me what the CDS derivatives amounts, positions, counterparties are exactly on GM bonds?
The current system is economically and politically corrupt. It is amazing to me that the CDS market is still operating. No doubt this stems from the “system meltdown” you are all so fond of frightening everyone with, and owning politicians.
Customer feedback (non-paying customer, but, hey, that’s the online market for you).
I flatter myself that I can understand MOST of your posts, but readily admit that being able to discuss them is a challenge. I very much appreciate all the effort you put into them. At this late date, so many months into the launch of Derivative Dribble, the fact that you are now going back to basics on “What is a derivative” I think is indicative of the very difficult, perhaps even insurmountable task you face, in making the case for the existence of your industry. I have the same problem when talking finance at cocktail parties myself.
Charles has been kind of harsh, and on behalf of your wider readership, I apologize for that. That’s the risk you take with going online. I have to say, though, I like this line of his:
“I’m even less convinced that CDS is a viable market that adds one cent of value to the economy.”
I know you have any number of variously complicated ways to answer that question for people who know what you’re talking about. But what is the “elevator pitch” for derivatives now? Why do they deserve a future? I have an intuitive sense that I can’t easily put into words why derivatives should not just be outlawed and banned forever, but why can’t you guys make a simple case for them? WHY, dammit, should derivatives be allowed to exist – and why can’t you guys give an answer that doesn’t start with either “Ok, this will be tedious, but try to follow along…” or “allocation…blah blah…efficiency of capital…blah blah…distribution of risk…blah blah…at least theoretically…”. Hell, I know more about finance than your average Joe, but I also know when I’m failing to make my case.
Shadow Bankers is a great site, but it’s still talking about the golden age when derivatives (and things people think are derivatives) were supposed to be working properly and distributing risk in ways that would make the world better.
From an academic standpoint, I’m interested after-the-fact in learning about this shadow world that used to thrive among us. But after all these months, I still haven’t heard at a “senate hearing” kind of level why the hell you guys should still be allowed to do what you do. What is the future of derivatives? Why should they have a future? Not just in theory, but in practice, why should we believe you won’t concentrate risk rather than distribute it? Why should we believe that the benefits of what you do are actually going to be distributed, rather than go into your annual bonuses? Forget the one cent of economic value – what kind of case can you make that the admittedly fascinating products you create might actually create a zillion cents of economic value, NEXT TIME?
Derivatives are dangerous, and not just to risk-seeking fat cats. Derivatives are dangerous to little babies, senior citizens, low-income families and people who can’t even begin to understand why a CMO is not a derivative.
Granted, even vanilla stocks and bonds can take a bit of explaining to most people, but those things aren’t that dangerous, because everyone at least understands that those prices go up and down, even if they don’t really know why. I know your site is not targeted at the lay person, but coming up with that ‘elevator pitch’ that a lay person can understand would, I think, really help your case. As our biochem professors said: “If you can’t explain your research in 1 minute to a 9 year-old, then your grant’s probably not getting renewed next year.”
BH,
Thanks for your comment. I understand that there’s a lot of confusion surrounding the market. I like to think I’ve helped to clear things up a bit. I’m writing something for the Roosevelt Institute soon, and I think I’ll make that a gentle introduction to derivatives and explain in very simple terms what they’re used for and why.
I guess, to be fair, I should have said “structured finance” instead of “derivative” at some places in that rant – but you know what I mean, having been to a few cocktail parties yourself.